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I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of the quality, a knockoff handbag is still a knockoff. It
was on this premise that Gucci America, Inc. filed suit against Daffy’s,
Inc. for selling counterfeit Gucci handbags.1 Gucci alleged that Daffy’s
violated its trademark protection under the Lanham Act.2 In the lawsuit,
Gucci asserted that it was concerned about the possible confusion of
consumers who purchased counterfeit “Jackie-O” handbags, believing
them to be genuine Gucci products.3 Neither the district court nor the
circuit court allowed Gucci relief against Daffy’s.4 This note examines
how that decision fits within the Lanham Act.
[1]

II. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
A. Historical Perspective on Trademarks

* Sarah Cone is currently a second-year law student at the T. C. Williams School of Law
at the University of Richmond in Richmond, Virginia.
1
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., No. CIV.A.00-4463, 2000 WL 1720738, at *1 (D.N.J.
Nov. 14, 2000).
2
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2000).
3
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).
4
Id. at 229.
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[2]
In ancient Rome, trademarks served much the same purpose as
they do in the United States today.5 They helped consumers identify the
creator of an object while creating a connection between the quality of the
product and the creator’s name.6 Even wine jugs in ancient Rome were
marked with details such as the manufacturer and creation date to protect
the producers.7 In the Middle Ages, paintings could be protected from
trademark infringement, and innkeepers who sold ordinary wine under a
false name could be hanged in the Fourteenth Century.8
B. The Lanham Act
1. Provisions
[3]
The Lanham Act is the current federal statute governing trademark
registration and infringement.9 The Act permits civil action against
anyone who
[U]ses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person . . . .10
Under the statute, a plaintiff may be entitled to profits, damages, and costs
of the action if there is “a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) … or a
willful violation under section 1125(c).”11
5

Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REV.
29, 30 (1911).
6
Jed S. Rakoff & Ira B. Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting: The Inadequacy of Existing
Remedies, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 493, 496-97 (1983).
7
Id. at 496.
8
9

Rogers, supra note 5, at 32-33.

1 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.04(3)(a)
(51st ed. 2004).
10
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)-(a)(1)(A) (2000).
11
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Section 1125(c) enumerates remedies for the “dilution of famous
marks”; section 1125(d) discusses cyberpiracy, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)-(d).
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2. In Need of Botox
[4]
The judicial circuits are “effectively the courts of last resort” in
trademark infringement cases because “Congress rarely intercedes, and …
the Supreme Court has other things on its mind.”12 Despite the existence
of the Lanham Act, “each circuit continues to create and apply its own
version of trademark law.”13 For instance, in the Second Circuit “willful
deceptiveness” is a hurdle to an award of profits,14 while the Seventh
Circuit does not require willfulness to “justify an award of profits.”15
“Each circuit has developed its own test for deciding whether or not to
grant preliminary injunctive relief.”16 Most circuits consider the
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury to the plaintiff,
injury to the defendant versus injury to the plaintiff, and public interest.17
However, the Second and Ninth Circuits require fewer of these
considerations, and the Seventh Circuit splits them into a two-tiered test.18
Even those courts that consider the same factors do so in an inconsistent
way.19 Inconsistent holdings, as well as court-invented doctrines and
standards, permeate trademark litigation, leading some to believe the
precedent surrounding the Lanham Act may need a “face-lift.”20
Unfortunately, Congress may not be prepared for a complete overhaul of
the Act,21 leaving different rules in force in different circuits.22
III. DESIGNER V. DISCOUNTER
A. Case History
12

JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, THE LANHAM ACT: TIME FOR A
FACE-LIFT? 1 (2002).
13
Id. at 3.
14
Id. at 19 (quoting George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir.
1992)).
15
Id. at 20 (quoting Ruolo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989)).
16
3 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE §
14.02(3)(b) (51st ed. 2004).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. (explaining that the Fourth Circuit permits an injunction if there is a “decided
imbalance,” yet the Eighth and Tenth Circuits look for a need “for more deliberate
investigation”).
20
JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, THE LANHAM ACT: TIME FOR A
FACE-LIFT? 1 (2002).
21
Id. at 22.
22
Id. at 3.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XI, Issue 2

1. The Purchase and Sale of Gucci Handbags
[5]
Daffy’s sells popular brands of clothing at discount prices.23
Among the items it once sold were Gucci handbags.24 Daffy’s bought 594
handbags from supplier Sara’s Collection, Inc. for $238 to $250 each; the
bags appeared to be Gucci’s “Jackie-O” model.25 Because Sara’s
Collection was not in Gucci’s authorized chain of distribution, Daffy’s
decided to exercise “an excess of caution.”26 Daffy’s attempted to
authenticate the bags through an inspection by a salesclerk at a New Jersey
Gucci outlet store and by sending one for repair to the Gucci repair center
in New York.27 The salesclerk examined the bag, compared it to another
in the store, and told the Daffy’s employee who made the inquiry that it
was authentic Gucci.28 Because the damaged bag was repaired and
returned without question, Daffy’s concluded it too was genuine.29
Daffy’s sold 588 of the bags before receiving a letter from Gucci insisting
that it stop selling the bags and disclose its supplier.30 Despite the belief
that it had done nothing wrong, Daffy’s removed the remaining handbags
from its stores.31
2. Gucci’s Lawsuit
[6]
Gucci filed suit for an Order to Show Cause why Daffy’s should
not be enjoined from selling the counterfeit bags and for expedited
discovery of Daffy’s supplier.32 The district court first evaluated whether
or not the bags were authentic.33 The bags did turn out to be counterfeit,
but were virtually indistinguishable from genuine Gucci bags.34 The court
then considered Gucci’s requests for a recall, an injunction forbidding
Daffy to use the Gucci trademark, a finding of willful infringement, and

23

Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 229 (3d Cir. 2003).
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., No. CN.A.00-4463, 2000 WL 1720738, at *1 (D.N.J.
Nov. 14, 2000).
25
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 229.
26
Gucci, 2000 WL 1720738, at *1.
27
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 230.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 230-31.
24
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the profits from Daffy’s sales.35 Finding only that Daffy’s had infringed
Gucci’s trademark, the court denied all of Gucci’s requests.36 On appeal,
the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling.37
B. The Majority Opinion
[7]
The circuit court examined the decision of the district court for an
abuse of discretion.38 It explained that an abuse of discretion has occurred
if there has been an error in fact-finding, in legal conclusions, or in
applying the law to the facts.39 Although Gucci requested a recall of the
counterfeit products, the court did not agree that the public benefit of such
an action would outweigh harm to Daffy’s, which the court deemed an
innocent infringer.40 The court also reviewed Gucci’s request for an
injunction against Daffy’s, as well as an award of lost profits.41
1. Injunctive Relief
[8]
The court could grant injunctive relief “according to the principles
of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable.”42 After
Daffy’s pulled the counterfeit Gucci handbags from its shelves, it
“voluntarily enacted” a policy of “not dealing in Gucci products.”43
Unsatisfied with what it considered an impermanent arrangement, Gucci
asked the court to grant a permanent injunction court-ordering this policy
and protecting Gucci from potential future infringement.44
[9]
Considerations for a permanent injunction, as required by the Third
Circuit in Shields v. Zuccarini, include “actual success on the merits,”
irreparable injury from denial of the injunction, greater harm to defendant
from granting the injunction, and the public interest.45 The court admitted
that “ ‘trademark infringement amounts to irreparable injury as a matter of
35

Id. at 231.
Id. at 231-32.
37
Id. at 229.
38
Id. at 233.
39
Id. (citing Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 472
(3d Cir. 1990) (quoting International Union United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)).
40
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 234.
41
Id. at 235.
42
15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000).
43
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 236.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 236-37 (citing Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001)).
36
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law,’” even in the case of a high-quality counterfeit.46 However, Gucci
did not argue loss of control until its appeal. The court concluded “that
aspect of irreparable injury was [sic] therefore been waived.”47
[10] Additionally, Gucci claimed that it was up to Daffy’s to refute
future harm.48 The court considered Gucci’s arguments in light of a case
involving Barney, the purple dinosaur.49 The Third Circuit noted that the
defendant in the Barney case continued to rent the costumes after being
informed of the infringement and that the plaintiff lacked control over the
behavior of the person inside the costume.50 In that case, the
circumstances required a permanent injunction.51 The Third Circuit
explained, however, that the injunction prohibiting future costume rentals
did not automatically require an injunction against Daffy’s because the
infringements were not analogous.52 The Barney trademark could suffer
much more harm through the actions of costume renters than could Gucci
from the sale of high-quality bags.53 Therefore, the appellate court
determined that the district court did not overstep its discretion in refusing
Gucci’s request under the Shields test.54
2. Profits
[11] Gucci was eligible to recover Daffy’s profits “subject to the
principles of equity.”55 The district court relied on SecuraComm
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc.56 to assess the principle of equity as it
applied to Gucci and Daffy’s.57 The court in SecuraComm explained that

46

Gucci, 354 F.3d at 237 (quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371,
378 (3d Cir. 1992)).
47
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 237.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 237-38. Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir.
2001), involved the rental of costumes that looked similar to the characters on the popular
children’s show.
50
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 238, 239 n.12.
51
Id. at 239.
52
Id. at 238, 239 n.12.
53
Id. at 238, 239 n.12.
54
Id. at 238-39.
55
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
56
166 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 1999).
57
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 239.
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willful infringement is central to awarding profits.58 When the Third
Circuit decided SecuraComm, the Lanham Act’s language read:
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a
violation under section 43(a), shall have been established in
any civil action arising under this Act, the plaintiff shall be
entitled … to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action.59
Gucci claimed that amendments to the Lanham Act since SecuraComm
have clarified Congress’ intention to require willfulness only in situations
involving the dilution of a famous mark.60 The Act now reads:
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation
under section 43(a) or (d), or a willful violation under
section 43(c), shall have been established in any civil action
arising under this Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled … to
recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained
by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.61
However, in Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 62 the court
refused “to adopt a bright-line rule in which a showing of willful
infringement is a prerequisite to an accounting of profits.”63 Instead, the
Fifth Circuit deemed willfulness “an important factor which must be
considered when determining whether an accounting of profits is
appropriate.”64 The Third Circuit recognized that equitable factors should
still be considered, including whether or not there was willful
infringement, and determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not awarding Daffy’s profits to Gucci.65

58

SecuraComm, 166 F.3d at 187.
Id. at 186 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000)).
60
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 240.
61
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
62
313 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2002).
63
Id. at 349.
64
Id.
65
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 241-42.
59
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C. The Dissent
[12] Judge Rosenn dissented, pointing out that the district court ignored
that one purpose of the trademark statute is “to protect the public from
deceit.”66 Rosenn argued that the court’s decision did “nothing to
discourage trade-mark infringement.”67
1. Injunctive Relief
[13] Although Judge Rosenn cited the Shields test as the appropriate
determination for whether to issue an injunction, he disagreed that the
burden of proof was on Gucci to prove irreparable harm.68 Instead, he
alleged that the burden was on Daffy’s to prove otherwise because of the
majority’s admission that “trademark infringement amounts to irreparable
injury as a matter of law.”69 For the same reason, Judge Rosenn refuted
the majority’s assertion that Gucci waived its claim of irreparable harm.70
Further, he explained the need for an injunction because “[n]o legal
obligation prevents Daffy’s from … resuming sales of purported Gucci
products.”71 He pointed out “[t]he unwillingness of Daffy’s to stipulate
that in the future it would not sell Gucci bags” as justification for issuing
the injunction.72
2. Profits
[14] Agreeing with Gucci, Judge Rosenn explained that amendments to
the Lanham Act superseded SecuraComm: “[t]he specific inclusion of the
word ‘willful’ prior to ‘violation’ in the same sentence with the word
‘violation’ without any adjective suggests an intentional contrast between
the requirements for proving each type of violation.”73 Without
willfulness, an equitable remedy requires the trademark owner not “retain
the beneficial interest.”74 Judge Rosenn claimed that the majority
66

Id. at 244 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
Id. (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
68
Id. at 247 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
69
Id. at 247-48 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (quoting S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968
F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992)).
70
Id. at 248 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 249 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
72
Id. (Rosenn., J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
74
Id. at 246 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
67
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unreasonably burdened Gucci to prove that Daffy’s customers purchased
the handbags because of the Gucci name, but “[i]t cannot be seriously
doubted that customers paid a premium for the Gucci name.”75
[15] Judge Rosenn also refuted the majority’s characterization of
Daffy’s as an innocent infringer because of the high-risk nature of the
discount business and the purchase of the Gucci handbags from a business
outside of Gucci’s distribution chain.76 He claimed that Daffy’s
authentication attempt was “simply a superficial effort to cover itself in
the event of a lawsuit.”77 Between the innocent infringer and the innocent
infringed, the equities favor the latter.78 Since equity principles favored
Gucci, and willfulness is not a requirement for awarding profits, Gucci
was eligible to recover profits against Daffy’s.
IV. ANALYSIS
[16] Gucci is perhaps among the most recognized names in the fashion
world. Its reputation and relatively high price tags make Gucci a likely
target for counterfeiters looking to make a quick dollar. Although Gucci
was the victim of counterfeiting,79 the Third Circuit held that the district
court’s denial of injunctive relief and profits under the Lanham Act was
reasonable.80
A. Injunctive Relief
1. The Standard
[17] The Lanham Act permits courts to grant an injunction “according
to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem
reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark.
. . .”81 It does not, however, enumerate the principles of equity or which
terms are “reasonable.” Therefore, a court must look to precedent and
apply its interpretation of the law to the facts of the case.

75

Id. at 246-47 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
77
Id. (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 246 (quoting Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 1989)).
79
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 230.
80
Id. at 229.
81
15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000).
76
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2. Third Circuit Precedent
[18] Under the Shields test, the district court was required to consider
four factors in assessing a request for injunctive relief.82 Irreparable injury
is one of these four factors.83 Even if the dissent correctly characterized
the lack of an irreparable harm waiver, the district court still had discretion
in evaluating the other considerations.84 After determining that the
handbags were counterfeit, the district court considered the factors of
harm to the defendant and the public interest.85 The Third Circuit
considered the district court’s decision and deemed it reasonable in light
of the Shields test.86
3. In Other Circuits
[19] In the Eleventh Circuit, the issuance of an injunction is “an
extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant
clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to all four elements.”87
However, the Sixth Circuit described the same factors as considerations
“to be balanced and not prerequisites that must be satisfied.”88 As each
appellate court may have different interpretations of how to apply the
same or similar factors, it follows that the district courts also evaluate the
factors differently. Thus, the district court could still have deemed an
injunction inappropriate.
B. Profits
1. Requiring Willfulness
[20] Deciding when to award an accounting of profits has been the least
clear issue surrounding the Lanham Act in federal jurisprudence.89 Based
82

Gucci, 354 F.3d at 236-37.
Id. at 236.
84
See supra Part III.C.1.
85
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 236-37.
86
Id. at 238-39.
87
Davidoff & Cie S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)).
88
In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992); In re DeLorean
Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985).
89
Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in
Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 863-64
(2002).
83
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on the black-and-white language of the Lanham Act, there is no
willfulness requirement to allow remedies for infringement, 90 yet the
courts have been reluctant to award profits without at least a consideration
of willfulness.91 The Fifth Circuit has been “the only” appellate court to
consider how willfulness comports with the 1999 amendment to the
Lanham Act.92
2. The Third Circuit’s “Kinda, Sorta” Requirement of Willfulness
[21] If SecuraComm is no longer binding precedent in the Third Circuit,
willful infringement may still have “a central role” in alternative
guidelines.93 To eliminate consideration of willfulness “would require
awarding profits in all cases of infringement.”94 The appellate court
admitted that its holding in SecuraComm may have changed after the
Lanham Act amendment.95 It found, however, that by either standard the
district court committed no error.96 Thus, the Third Circuit also
considered the district court’s denial of profits a reasonable decision by
the balance of equities.97
C. Results
1. Still Murky Rules Regarding Willfulness
[22] Unfortunately, the Gucci court created no definite answer to clarify
the muddied waters of Lanham Act jurisprudence. In February 2003,
90

GILSON, supra note 12, at 20.
See, e.g., Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2002)
(affirming a factor-based approach, including intent to confuse or deceive, to determine
an accounting of profits), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 814 (2003).
92
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting); Quick Techs., 313 F.3d at 348-49.
93
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 239. See also Conway-Jones, supra note 81, at 864 (explaining
that, despite an apparent Supreme Court answer of not requiring bad faith, subsequent
circuit and district court decisions left a “schizophrenic view” of the issue). SecuraComm
was filed on Jan. 20, 1999, SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d
182 (3d Cir. 1999); the Lanham Act amendment was made on Nov. 29, 1999, 15 U.S.C. §
1117 (2000).
94
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 243.
95
Id. at 242. See also MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank, No. 02 Civ. 3691, 2004
WL 326708, at *11 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2004) (explaining that the Third Circuit left
open the issue of whether or not the existing precedent was altered by the 1999
amendment).
96
Gucci, 354 F.3d at 242.
97
Id. at 243.
91
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MasterCard and the First National Bank of Omaha disagreed regarding the
use of trademarks “OneSmart” and “Smart One.”98 The district court
pointed to cases from 1992 and 1996 to explain the law of the Second
Circuit: as a prerequisite to recovery, “a plaintiff must prove that the
infringer acted in bad faith.”99 The court explained that the part of the
amendment to the Lanham Act that did not include “willful” merely
affirms the “existing judicial interpretation of that language.”100 Without
sufficient evidence of MasterCard’s willful infringement, the district court
denied First National Bank’s motion for summary judgment on its claims
for monetary relief.101 The Southern District of New York ruled on
another trademark infringement case in 2003 bearing remarkable
resemblance to Gucci.102 In its decision, the court did not point out the
same precedents as its February case in awarding damages, nor did it
make clear whether it still considered bad faith a prerequisite to awarding
damages. It relied on what it regarded as obvious willful action and
awarded relief under the Lanham Act’s statutory damages provision.103
2. The Decision Fell Short of the Statute’s Intent
[23] The court’s decision in Gucci failed to penalize the infringer.
Daffy’s voluntarily adopted a “no Gucci” policy, but, as the dissent
pointed out, nothing prevented Daffy’s from rescinding that policy.104 In
the meantime, Daffy’s netted $51,064 selling counterfeit Gucci
handbags.105 The court assumed that the people who purchased the
handbags thought they were buying genuine Gucci bags.106 To the
contrary, New York City and the surrounding areas are known for having
98

MasterCard, 2004 WL 326708.
Id. at *11 (quoting Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A.,
Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996)).
100
MasterCard, 2004 WL 326708, at *11.
101
Id. at *12. But cf. Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A.,
Inc., No. 99-7329, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 660, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) (refusing to
change the legal standard requiring a showing of bad faith to recover monetary damages
after two remands).
102
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
amended in part by Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 328 F. Supp. 2d 439
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
103
Id. at 520. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2000).
104
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2003) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting).
105
Id. at 246 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
106
Id. at 246 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
99
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designer handbags at discount prices, many of which are fake. Not only is
Daffy’s in a business involving “considerable risk,”107 but its customers
must also have some concept of caveat emptor. Proof that customers
bought the product because of the trademark would be nearly impossible
to obtain, short of polling the purchasers. Whether customers bought them
because they thought they were Gucci, thought they were good Gucci
knockoffs, or thought they were nice bags even though they had no idea
what the “GG” logo represented, is of no consequence because Daffy’s
still profited from the unlawful use of Gucci’s mark. It made money
selling a product bearing a false trademark.
[24] Daffy’s covered itself by attempting to authenticate the suspect
bags and posing as an innocent infringer.108 In addition, the only deterrent
preventing the discounter from selling counterfeit Gucci bags again is the
fear of being dragged back into court. As such, the result of Gucci is that
“innocent infringers are effectively immune from having to disgorge
profits, despite the fact that innocence is no defense to a charge of
infringement.”109
V. FORECAST
[25] The circuit courts have wrapped themselves in a quandary of
inconsistent decisions. Even though over ninety-five percent of trademark
cases settle before trial,110 there is good potential for considerable legal
discrepancies and a lot of forum shopping as a result.111
A. Injunctive Relief
[26] Without Supreme Court precedent or statutory overhaul, the
principles of equity considerations and reasonable injunction terms will
remain cloudy. Each circuit has made up its own mind as to what
comprises the principles of equity, and there are “sixty-six jurisdictions
capable of making or changing trademark law, not to mention several
107

Id. at 244 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244. Cf. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 315 F. Supp. 2d 511
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding willfulness existed when an infringer did not attempt a
reasonable inquiry into the authenticity of the infringing goods it sold).
109
GILSON, supra note 12, at 19.
110
Id. at 6.
111
See Id. at 20 (questioning why a plaintiff would file in the Second Circuit where
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hundred individual district court judges.”112 While some may utilize the
same factors, each may evaluate them differently, a practice that inevitably
results in inconsistent decisions in varying courts based on similar
circumstances.
B. Profits
[27] Again, absent binding precedent or statutory clarification, the
ability to recover profits from the sale of infringing goods will continue to
be determined based on different factors. However, there is hope for more
consistency as some courts appear to be shying away from their own
statute-changing precedents. For example, although the Third Circuit did
not announce in Gucci that SecuraComm’s willful infringement
requirement is no longer binding, it left the door open for that issue to be
considered in the future.113 Similarly, even though the Southern District
of New York refused to reconsider its requirement of bad faith, pointing
out that it was inappropriate to change the legal standard after two
remands, it did not close the door to the possibility that the legal standard
was actually in need of changing.114
[28] Unfortunately, the outcome in Gucci may have unintentionally
opened a Pandora’s box. Even if bad faith may no longer be a prerequisite
to awarding damages, the Third Circuit still allowed Daffy’s to benefit
from its infringement.115 It pointed to “[t]he price and quality of the
handbags at issue, the small number of bags sold, Daffy’s status as an
innocent infringer, and the possibility that Gucci could recover from the
actual manufacturer of the bags” as justification for not awarding
profits.116 Such a statement is extraordinarily helpful to counterfeiters
who can now use that criterion to avoid a judgment against them.
VI. CONCLUSION
[29] The Third Circuit’s ruling in Gucci comported with the language
of the Lanham Act but failed to reach its goals. Trademarks are meant to
protect both the mark owner and the public. For as long as people have
been making products, this has been the intention. Congress added the
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protection to federal statutory law through the Lanham Act, providing
civil action and remedies when a trademark is infringed. However, these
civil actions have created a body of jurisprudence as diverse as the judges
who wrote the decisions.
[30] Regrettably for Gucci, this has resulted in the sale of almost 600
counterfeit accessories for which it received no compensation. Further,
the Third Circuit’s decision has done nothing to bestow Gucci with any
confidence that the same discounter will be prevented from infringing on
its trademark again in the future and profiting as a result.
[31] Most notably at issue was the idea of willful infringement as a
prerequisite to an awarding of damages or profits. The court admitted that
while willfulness or bad faith may not be a prerequisite to recovering
profits, they could fit within factors and considerations the court uses to
assess such a request. As case precedent currently stands, some circuits
consider willfulness a prerequisite while others do not.117 For the judicial
system, this could mean increased forum shopping in trademark
infringement claims. However, the bottom line is that the outcome of
Gucci proves that it is very possible that a court may permit an infringer to
profit from its actions.
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